As this colloquium's title reflects, trial rates are down; one in one hundred federal civil cases goes to trial. Less in focus is that case filings are also flattening and for an array of reasons, one of which is that millions of potential claimants are prevented from pursuing claims collectively (either in courts or in arbitration) because of provisions in job applications and consumer documents precluding class actions.
To the extent people do go to court, they are often greeted by mandates to resolve disputes privately. Courts are now venues in which public adjudication has taken a back seat to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which generally takes place outside the public purview. Agencies are another important venue of adjudicatory procedures, where tens of thousands of adjudications take place.' Many of their proceedings also involve unrepresented parties, and many agencies' hearings are not readily accessible to the public.
In short, vanishing trials are but a piece of the privatization and relocation of process. In an earlier article, I used the term "dispute diffusion" to capture the eclipse of adjudication in courts as the central paradigm of government-based dispute resolution. 2 I further argued that a vanety of sources are producing this new policy through statutes, federal .and state regulations, procedural rulemaking, and by way of court-made doctrine. In the 1980s, I identified a shift to "managerial judges" 3 -deploying judges to become conciliators. In addition, other individuals are enlisted to serve as "neutrals" or as arbitrators, both in and out of courts. More recently, I identified an array of provisions, which I called "Alternative Civil Procedure Rules" (ACPR), that organize these diverse sets of practices but do so through a maze of different promulgations. 4 Rather than an accessible and public codification, of which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are an iconic example, the ACPR are hard to find and to piece together. But taken collectively, the ACPR-like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-reflect norms about what procedural systems should do. The ACPR value privatized processes.
Further, unlike contemporary rule systems based in courts, the ACPR neither address the The figure details that about 360,000 civil and criminal cases were filed in the federal trial-level courts in 2010, along with more than a million bankruptcy petitions. State filings numbered more than 47 million, and that figure excludes what figure 2 includes-filings that states have catalogued as juvenile and traffic cases. What do we know about who brings cases and how they are handled? Given the volume of activity in state courts, the development of national data is challenging. Yet the National Center for State Courts provided a window through its 2015 publication, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, which analyzed almost a million cases that were disposed of during 2012-2013 in ten major urban counties. 12 As the report details, most of the cases concluded within a year. In most, at least one party was without a lawyer, and most of the dispositions were administrative conclusions, rather than by trials or other forms of adjudication.
Figure 3 brings the work of state courts into focus by providing details about state court filings. 13 This chart highlights some of the major findings of the report, specifically that about two-thirds of the filings involved contract claims and that more than one-half of that set of claims were landlord-tenant and debt collection cases. 14 The more recent survey contrasts with the 1992 data collection, when about half of the claims analyzed were tort cases. 15 The National Center for State Courts's 2012-2013 data put tort cases at 7 percent. 16 14. See STATE COURT 2012-2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at iii.
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The 1992 data were drawn from case outcomes in the seventy-five "most populous counties" in the country. Of about 762,000 tort, contract, and property dispositions, approximately 378,000 were tort cases. 
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As to the parties, information was available about the presence of lawyers in about 650,000 cases. In most, "at least one party was self-represented, usually the defendant."l 7 The researchers found that the results of the lawsuits were that, in about three-quarters of the judgments, the sums were under $5,200. As for the means of resolution, the study reported that 4 percent were disposed of by trials. 1 8 The data on other forms of dispositions are what social scientists call "noisy," in that about a quarter have an "unspecified judgment," and the grounds for the 35 percent dismissed or the 10 percent settled were not obvious from the court documents. 19 Yet overall, the National Center for State Courts's analysis resonates with the discussion in this colloquium by Taunya Banks about civil trials as "a film illusion." 20 Further, the numbers put into sharp relief the importance of identifying the ethics of settlement, as Howard Erichson analyzes, "in the absence of anticipated adjudication." 2 1
Turn then to the federal courts, where the arena to study is narrower, the resources are greater, and hence more data are available. A first point is that an assumption of the federal courts as crowded and overworked is not supported by the aggregate data. Filings in the federal court system, which had more than doubled between 1970 and 1985, have experienced little growth in the last three decades. An overview of filings in the U.S. district courts during the last century is provided in figure 4.22
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CivIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at 20. Adjudication for these purposes included a judge or jury trial, summary judgment, and binding arbitration. In the 1992 survey, 62 percent of the cases were disposed of through settlements, and 3 percent were disposed of by judge or jury trial. Thus, of the almost one million cases, 32,124 trials took place, of which 1109 (3 percent) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97 percent) were bench trials. Jury awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3 percent) of the cases, and 75 percent of the jury awards in tort cases were below $152,000. The 2012-2013 study also noted that, as contrasted with 1992, both parties were represented in 24 percent of the bench trials. Id. at iv, 20-25.
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Id. at 20-21. The dismissal rate recorded in the 2012-2013 study was more than three times higher than that recorded in the 1992 study, and the settlement rate was less than one-fifth of that recorded in the 1992 study. Id. at 21. The authors of the 2012-2013 study noted that differences in methodology may account for the different results. The newer study collected data from courts with limited rather than general jurisdiction, and that selection affects the cases that fell into the study. Id. Further, data for the 2012-2013 study were taken from case management systems rather than through researchers looking at individual court files, as they had in 1992. Id. at 22. Therefore, the study's authors reported, "It is particularly difficult to interpret the dismissal and unspecified judgment rates in the [2012-2013] study." Id. For instance, the study explains that litigants may request that settled cases be dismissed with prejudice and that cases with these designations were classified as settlements in the 2012-2013 study but that if the cases were coded in the case management systems as dismissals, the study would do so as well. Id. Moreover, the study reports that "unspecified judgments may include a substantial proportion of cases that were actually default judgments." Id. In the 2016 case weighting system, the weights assigned to a number of types of civil cases decreased, including for patent, environmental, FOIA, and death penalty habeas corpus matters, while the weights assigned to many criminal case type categories increased. See Krafka, Oct. 5 E-mail, supra note 30.
The method of computing weights comes through deputy court clerks, sitting in court at all hearings, conferences, and trials at which a district judge presides. No such data are recorded for the work judges do in chambers. E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to author (Nov. 16, 2016, 1:48 PM) [hereinafter Krafka, Nov. 16 E-mail] (on file with the Fordham Law Review). As Krafka explained, in the 2014 revisions, the courts assigned a value for the time spent on events that were recorded on the docket in the cases analyzed and did so through surveying a selected sample of active district court judges who were asked to estimate the times spent on various activities, such as discovery motions in different types of cases. Then, case weights were computed by summing "the time associated with all of the proceeding and non-proceeding events docketed in a large sample of cases" and categorizing "individual cases into case types" to determine averages of time spent within a case time, so as to have "the basis for (non-normalized) weights." Id. In addition to this kind of disuniformity, a remarkable amount of civil litigation in the federal courts is clustered together, consolidated under the 1968 "multidistrict litigation" (MDL) statute 36 and distributed in an uneven pattern to specific district court judges around the United States. Understanding the prevalence of aggregation in the federal courts requires a shift from looking at filings to analyzing pending cases. In contrast to the flattening filings in the last three decades, the number of pending civil cases (tracked in figure 7 ) has grown-more than tripling between 1970 and 2015 and increasing from about 300,000 cases in 2010 to 341,813 cases in 2015.37 But tens of thousands of these cases are not dealt with individually. Rather, as of the fall of 2015, almost 40 percent of federal civil cases were part of MDLs,38 created when a panel of judges ruled that the statutory criteria for pretrial aggregation ("civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact . .. pending in different districts") were met. 39 In specific federal district court judges to preside during the pretrial phase over the cases so grouped. 40 As the essays by Lynn Baker, Theodore Rave, and Adam Zimmerman in this colloquium discuss, 4 1 these mandatory, non-optout, pretrial aggregations are run by court-appointed lead lawyers-a Plaintiff Steering Committee (PSC) or Plaintiff Executive Committee (PEC)-functioning as ad hoc law firms and representing a significant number of plaintiffs who had filed individual lawsuits. 42 The growth of the aegis of MDL is significant, as is charted in figure 8 , which shows the relationship between the pending civil docket and cases grouped together in MDL proceedings. 43 In 1991, fewer than 2,232 cases (or about 1 percent of the civil docket) were part of MDL proceedings. 44 In 2013, about a third of the caseload was in MDL proceedings. 4 In 2015, for example, more than 150 judges were assigned one MDL; 28 had two MDLs each; and 10 had three or more, some of which involved different manufacturers of a product alleged to be harmful. note 38. After tabulating the numbers presented in the report in an Excel spreadsheet, we were able to generate a pivot table wherein we could filter the data for active MDLs only and then calculate the number of MDLs each judge was assigned. One judge was assigned seven cases involving mesh used in pelvic surgeries. See Id.
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(and in some districts, also to magistrate judges "on the wheel"), 48 does not apply during the pretrial process for this large segment of the docket. 4 9
Another facet of the federal courts is the absence of lawyers in a significant portion of the federal docket. As can be seen in figure 950 and figure 10,51 more than 25 percent of the plaintiffs filing civil cases in federal courts do so without counsel at the trial level; 52 more than 50 percent seek appellate review without lawyers' assistance. 53 48. The image of assignments as random-at both trial and appellate levels-is not always reflected in practice in other areas. 
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Disaggregated by circuits, the range runs from about one-third to nearly two-thirds of the filings. 
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prisoner filings and many cases brought by people who are not incarcerated. 55 Thus, the analyses of lawyer activities by Andrew Pollis 56 and Morris Ratner, 57 and of the impact of new rulemaking on discovery discussed by Danya Reda,5 8 need to be read with an understanding that these issues relate to a small set of cases, which could be thought of as akin to luxury goods. 59 Moreover, the concerns of Susan Saab Fortney about the need for "prying open" courthouse doors for legal malpractice claims are amplified. 60 Despite efforts made by a subset of clients to increase regulation of lawyers through new kinds of claims and to reduce costs through litigation budgets, most people cannot afford lawyers, let alone pretrial discovery.
Commentators on procedure have labeled the contemporary era the "age of austerity." 6 1 In the United States, state courts have been the focus of concern. States are strapped for funding, and their courts have millions of litigants without lawyers. State judiciaries have established task forces on access to courts. Reports indicate that more than four million civil litigants in California courts lacked lawyers in 2009,62 and more than two million such litigants were unrepresented in New York courts.
63
My hope is to enlarge the lens so that the federal courts are also brought into such discussions. Comparatively, federal courts are rich in terms of buildings, staff, and judges. Yet, federal judges regularly report worry about resources and now face a significant proportion of litigants who appear in court without lawyers. 
1918
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The other structural fact about today's litigation landscape is that, as in this colloquium's title referencing "vanishing trials," almost no civil cases reach trial in the federal courts. As of 2015, about 1 in 100 civil lawsuits filed began a trial before either a judge or a jury. 64 In terms of numbers, 2,852 civil bench and 1,882 civil jury trials were completed in 2015; the count on the criminal side was 5,027 bench trials and 1,807 jury trials. 65 Because federal data collection neither makes time-study tracking easily available nor readily identifies cases by more than one kind of category of cause of action or by class action status, it is difficult to know which cases go to trial, let alone why that subset does so. An account of federal litigation would be enriched by understanding more about the 2,000 to 3,000 cases that are tried yearly-in terms of whether the litigants are represented, in classes or MDLs, the subject matter and stakes of the claims, and their distribution across the United States. 6 6 Many assume that all filings without lawyers result in dismissal, that cases which do go to trial include lawyers, or that no class actions go to trial. Here, I discuss a review of the 2,973 cases identified in a database provided by the Federal Judicial Center 67 and reporting on cases ending with a trial during the year between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015.
Let me start with litigants lacking lawyers. About 15 percent (450 cases) in this one-year snapshot of trial data were categorized as having at least one party unrepresented, and 0.6 percent (18 cases) had at least one party on both sides unrepresented. 68 Less than 2 percent of tried cases (43 cases) 64 . I am in the midst of other work trying to gain insights from inquiring into the cases that actually went to trial. Thus, we examined data released by the FJC on all civil cases. 
67.
Id. To identify cases on class actions, we filtered the civil cases database for cases with a value of 1 in the "CLASSACT" field. To obtain cases with pro se parties, we filtered the civil cases database for cases with a value of 1, 2, or 3 in the "PROSE" field. 68. Of the 450 unrepresented cases, 18 appeared to have both plaintiffs and defendants pro se; 334 had pro se plaintiffs, and 98 were defendant pro se cases. These data focus on lawyers in courts without trials. But the ambitious questions of this colloquium-what ethics guide lawyers in twenty-firstcentury dispute resolution-need also to take on administrative agency adjudication.
Efforts are underway to understand more about the adjudicatory work of administrative agencies, where tens of thousands of trial-like proceedings take place, and some proceed in the aggregate. 71 Returning to courthouses, as many have noted, judges do a good deal of adjudication without trials. Researchers have looked for other metrics, including "bench presence," tallying the hours judges spend in open court, whether on trial or not. 
69.
Id. The labeling did not always correspond to the individual cases tracked down thereafter. Moreover, records are incomplete in some instances. For example, an initial review identified fifty cases, but with subsequent analyses, we learned that forty-three class actions in FY 2015 appeared to have gone to trial.
70. In the FJC FY 2015 trial data set, another fourteen (0.5 percent) of the cases had a tag denoting that they were remanded from MDL proceedings. 
ETHICS BEYOND THE VANISHING TRIAL
with litigants and lawyers in chambers, in forms of alternative dispute resolution, but these activities take place outside the public realm. 73 A final basic fact to bring into focus is the array of new rulemaking-the ACPR I referenced at the outset-which governs ADR. Hundreds of local rules have been promulgated to govern ADR. Yet those rules rarely address, let alone protect, the rights of the public to know much about either the processes or the results. Privatization of process is the leitmotif. "Procedure as contract" was what I called this shift a decade ago, as courts promoted party-based agreement rather than dispute resolution in public courts. 74 This change in norms and practices is at the center of the essay by Norman Spaulding, looking at how the culture of independent lawyers serving as an adversarial check is eroding. 75 Whether such processes can provide fairness "beyond the adversary system," as Rebecca HollanderBlumoff puts it, is a question further explored below. Direct payment of lawyers, fee shifting from defendants to plaintiffs, and fee sharing through common benefit fund awards are methods of supporting access to courts and of regulating lawyers. Aggregation of cases is another way to create economies of scale. During the decades when federal dockets were growing, all these forms of subsidies were deployed; insurance and third-party financing were not much in focus.
In Congress also saw-and limited-the key role played by what were known as backup centers, which had served as networks for coordination and communication on housing, welfare, and consumer law. 84 Moreover, in 1996, Congress barred legal services lawyers from initiating or participating in class actions. 85 Again, the litany of prohibitions is familiar, as Congress imposed limits on forms of legislative advocacy, handling voter redistricting claims, initiating representation on behalf of prisoners, advocating that welfare laws were unconstitutional, or requesting attorney's fees. 86 Those regulations brought the question of lawyers' ethics to the fore in 2001 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that aspects of the restrictions prohibiting advice on arguments related to welfare law or seeking to amend welfare law were impermissible under the First Amendment. 87 Regulations also barred LSC lawyers from working on "adversarial" enforcement of final judgment and consent decrees. 88 Funding remains very limited. According to the LSC, in 2014, more than sixty-three million Americans were eligible for its services, 89 93 One measure of the pivotal role that lawyers play in various causes and social movements comes from congressional efforts to cut off lawyers from doing so. The targeted efforts to disempower legal services lawyers were sketched above. Congress also sought to limit lawyers representing prisoners. The Prison Litigation Reform Act 94 (PLRA), enacted in 1996, was animated by an effort to "STOP" (which was the acronym for an earlier version of the PLRA) the substantial successes that prisoners had achieved through conditions of confinement litigation. 95 The PLRA has had its own success; as Margo Schlanger, who has analyzed prisoner litigation for several decades, documents, the statute has "undermined prisoners' ability to bring, settle, and win lawsuits." 
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The PLRA imposed a requirement that prisoners use difficult administrative grievance procedures and pay special filing fees; further, Congress created new work for lawyers representing prisoners, while lowering their potential attorney's fees if successful. 97 Congress authorized defendants and intervenors to move to terminate injunctive relief (including long-standing consent decrees) and directed courts to do so, absent new fact-finding identifying ongoing constitutional violations that could only be redressed through narrowly drawn remedies. 98 Veronica Root has focused her contribution to the colloquium on monitors in litigation seeking economic redress. 99 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) ("In any civil action with respect to prison conditions
in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener."); id. § 3626(a)(2) ("Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief. . . ."). This intervention altered the market for legal services, as it slowed down certification by requiring judges to decide which clients and their lawyers would gain leadership status as the "most adequate plaintiff."l 09 Further, Congress sought to tie fee awards to client recoupment, by calling for fees to be based on the amount "actually paid to" the class, as contrasted with the value of the total fund established to be distributed. which rejected large-scale mass tort class settlements. In 2011, the Court made certification of class actions in the employment context more expensive through imposing exacting commonality requirements. 114 Yet, other arenas of activity prove that class actions retain their vitality, with examples ranging from environmental harms (the BP oil spill and VW emissions) to prison conditions and solitary confinement.
See
Further, as sketched above and is increasingly discussed, multidistrict litigation has become a home for mass torts. 
FAA.116
The Supreme Court has insisted that both state and federal courts enforce a myriad of arbitration provisions (promulgated by issuers of consumer credit, manufacturers of products, and employers) that preclude aggregation before any dispute has arisen.
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In "Diffusing Disputes," I discussed research seeking to understand whether the mass production of arbitration clauses (requiring claimants alleging violations of federal and state statutory and common law wrongs to proceed single file to decision makers designated by the clauses' providers) have produced a mass of arbitration.'18 But as I document there, empirical research has identified very few actual filings of individual arbitrations, as contrasted with the numbers of customers or employees subjected to those clauses. Rather than providing more paths for claimants, the provisions function to cut off users, thereby erasing as well as diffusing disputes.119
Lawyers are central in these developments, both as drafters of the clauses and as targets of potential defendants seeking to end the fee incentives available to lawyers if representing individuals in aggregates.
To understand the ways in which court access is denied requires looking at the forms that cut off that forum, as well as at the case law interpreting their importance. As Victor D. Quintanilla and Alexander B. Avtgis discuss in this colloquium, data suggest that the public views these provisions negatively.1 20 But even if public approval is lacking and the forms are not readily understood, people seeking jobs or buying products cannot negotiate the terms.
Because those provisions are buried in individual application forms or in the fine print of consumer documents, I believe it is important to publish and republish them, particularly here in an issue devoted to the work and ethics of lawyers.121 Even though the graphics provided below are dense and hard to read, these are the real forms replete with tiny print and presented to individuals and to courts. Figure 11 is the two-page "Application for Employment" that Waffle House ("America's Place to Work, America's Place to Eat") required prospective employees to sign. The printed terms that were imposed by Waffle House were generic, not personal. The form told all applicants that, were they to be employed, Waffle House could deduct from any monies due [them] , an amount to cover any shortages which may occur and that they had to indemnify the company against any legal liability for withholding wages. Moreover, if money, food, or 
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equipment to which he had access was alleged to be lost, applicants had "to submit to a polygraph" or other testing.
12 5
Below, I quote from the terms on dispute resolution set forth in microprint:
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant's employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment, including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is made. A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules shall be exclusive, final and binding on both parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns. The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be bome evenly by the parties.
126
What we know from the several decisions by federal judges is that Eric Baker signed the application on June 23, 1994, at a Waffle House in Columbia, South Carolina. Some weeks later, he was hired at another Waffle House miles away. Soon thereafter, Baker had a seizure (that the courts described as lasting "approximately thirty seconds") at work. After he lost his job in early September of 1994, Baker complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Waffle House had violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). After the EEOC filed an enforcement action in federal district court, Waffle House sought to dismiss the case and to compel the EEOC to go to arbitration.
7
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens held that the form did not impose a limit on a filing by the EEOC, which was authorized by Congress to "vindicate the public interest" as well as to seek victim-specific remedies. 128 The effects of this ruling underscore the relevance of lawyers to the capacity to pursue claims. Twenty-eight state attorneys general had argued to the Court that the EEOC should be able to proceed, as should they in enforcing state statutes. 129 Since the decision, state and federal officials have brought discrimination cases, and states have successfully rebuffed defendants' arguments that the forms preclude their doing So. 130 But for ordinary people, such forms mostly keep them out of court. Despite the Court's characterization of the employment applications and consumer documents as "contracts," these "pieces of paper" deserve no such stature. As explained long ago by Arthur Leff, the definition of a contract was "not only a deal, but dealing." 13 1 Through real negotiationseven on form provisions-"the possibility of monolithic one-sidedness" was reduced. 132 In contrast, the form that was signed by Eric Baker was one of many "products of non-bargaining"; as such, these were what Leff termed "unilaterally manufactured commodities." 133 As what Leff called a "thing," the law ought to regulate its quality as it did other products.
But, instead of limiting arbitration to negotiated contracts, the Court licensed expansive use of that product by applying the FAA to litigants claiming violations of the Credit Repair Organization Act in 2012 and to a family restaurant, Italian Colors, which argued that the American Express My concern is about mandates in nonnegotiated documents that require consumers and employees to forgo the pursuit of public rights. overcharged $30.22, alleged that the providers had violated California's consumer protection laws against deceptive and false advertising. 144 California law was clear on the question of the potential for group-based procedures, for the state had both a statute and a decisionl 4 5 governing the issue. Under California law, when class waivers were in a "consumer contract of adhesion," predictably small damage disputes could arise between the parties,1 46 and the "party with the superior bargaining power" was alleged to have "carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money," a waiver would be unenforceable because it functioned to exempt the party from responsibility for the allegedly willful injury inflicted.1 4 7
The U.S. Supreme Court held, however, that the FAA preempted California's rule, which stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."1 48 The AT&T Court rested its holding on "our cases," 1 4 9 which ascribed two rationales to the FAA: "judicial enforcement of privately made agreements to arbitrate"' 5 0 and elimination of the "costliness and delays of litigation."151
As many articles have since detailed, the numbers of clauses mandating arbitration have since soared in many sectors. A 1991 survey identified fewer than 4 percent of firms requiring arbitration in employment; by 2007, another study found that more than 45 percent of firms did so. 152 In 2008, the estimate was that "a quarter or more of all non-union employees in the United States"-thirty million employees-were covered.1
53
As I and others have also discussed, tens of millions of consumers are obliged to use arbitration. For example, virtually all providers of wireless services insist on mandatory arbitration, along with the option of using small claims court for individual actions. 154 Further, according to a 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), approximately fifty percent of credit card loans are subject to arbitration, 155 and nearly all that were studied "expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class basis." 1 56 That the purpose of arbitration clauses is to disable collective actions rather than to enable more access to bringing claims can be seen first by way of a brief discussion of a 2015 Supreme Court decision and by the data we gathered relating to individual claims against AT&T over a five-year period. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia157 is an odd case that on many metrics would seem to merit relatively little judicial attention. At issue was a clause written in 2007 in a service agreement that provided that "if the law of your state" made a waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, the obligation to arbitrate was likewise unenforceable. 158 Amy Imburgia and Kathy Greiner had sued DIRECTV and complained that DIRECTV violated California law by imposing early cancellation penalties "often as high as $480" and did so "directly from the customers' bank accounts or credit cards, using account information provided by the customers when they first ordered DIRECTV, without consulting them or otherwise obtaining their consent." 1 59
The plaintiffs claimed that the "early termination fees" bore "no relation to the damage, if any, incurred by DIRECTV in connection with an early termination of the service." 1 60 Rather, DIRECTV used the penalty "to force customers to pay for its services for at least 18 months (and sometimes longer) and prevent customers from readily changing to another satellite or cable provider, even if they are no longer able to use DIRECTV's service due to faulty equipment or other reasons." 6 1
The plaintiff class sought injunctive relief "on behalf of all current and former DIRECTV customers who were charged or may be charged an early cancellation penalty and monetary relief on behalf of current and former DIRECTV customers who paid DIRECTV an early cancellation penalty." 16 2 The proposed class action alleged that DIRECTV had violated the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act by "[flailing to disclose" adequately the terms and the method of collecting the cancellation fees, by including "unconscionable and unenforceable terms," and by collecting fees.1 63 The proposed class action also alleged that DIRECTV had violated California's false advertising law with misleading advertising. 169 The dissent, by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Sotomayor), argued that courts were to "give the customer, not the drafter, the benefit of the doubt" and hence provide "effective access to justice," 1 70 while Justice Thomas viewed the FAA as not applicable to the transaction. 171 DIRECTV is a lawsuit made from lawyers' drafting of arbitration clauses. But, unlike the class action waiver at issue in AT&T that affected millions of people and unlike the provisions in hundreds of documents related to consumer goods and employment, the DIRECTV dispute related only to older claims under clauses that lawyers, working for those imposing arbitration, should no longer use. Justice Ginsburg's dissent explained that under the Court's prior cases, the federal statute could itself be "preempted . .. by parties' intent," when set forth in contracts. 172 That approach can be found in the 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,173 discussing that parties could choose the governing law to apply. But in DIRECTV, the majority rejected what the contract drafters and Professions Code prohibiting any "fraudulent ... business act or practice" and its common law prohibition on unjust enrichment. had detailed, which was to vitiate the arbitration mandate and permit a class action in court.
Proponents of arbitration argue its utility in part by claiming it creates more access to bringing claims. Thus, just as a discussion of trials pivots around their increasing infrequency, a discussion of arbitration also requires inquiries into data about their use. As I detail elsewhere and sketch here, little evidence supports the position of arbitration enthusiasts that it expands the use of dispute resolution in a speedy and effective way. In fact, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in a mass of arbitrations.1 74 I provide two examples below, first from arbitrations involving wireless service providers and then from data from the CFPB. I chose to focus on claims against AT&T Mobility because that was the company involved in the decision approving the ban on class arbitrations.1 75 As detailed in "Diffusing Disputes," under California law, providers of arbitration services to consumers have to archive results in five-year intervals.1 76 The AAA has been designated by AT&T and has complied with state reporting mandates. By looking at five years of reporting, we identified 134 individual claims (about 27 a year) filed against AT&T between 2009 and 2014. 177 During that time period, the estimated number of AT&T wireless customers rose from 85 million to 120 million people, and lawsuits filed by the federal government charged the company with a range of legal breaches, including systematic overcharging for extra services and insufficient payments of refunds when customers complained. 178 More generally, the AAA, which is the largest nonprofit provider of arbitration services in the United States, averages under 1,500 consumer arbitrations annually;1 79 its full docket includes 150,000 to 200,000 filings a year. Thus, were arbitration providers to be in high demand; their capacity to respond would be limited.
My second example comes from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which looked at six credit-related markets for which, again, the AAA is the predominant provider of arbitration services. 181 The CFPB's "2013 Preliminary Results" reported millions of consumers subject to arbitration and found an average of 415 individual AAA filings per year from 2010 to 2012 in four consumer product markets-credit cards, checking accounts, payday loans, and prepaid cards. In its 2015 report, the CFPB added two products, private student loans and auto loans, to its analysis-bringing the three years' annual average up to 616.182 In the figure below,1 83 we summarize the findings that about two-thirds of the filings were by consumers, while the remaining filings included disputes brought by both parties as well as those by companies. 
IV. THE ETHICS OF LAWYERING IN DISPUTE DIFFUSION
I have sought to frame the questions of lawyers' ethics by starting not from lawyers and their work but from the world of dispute resolution in which transactional, litigating, and problem-solving lawyers pursue their profession. A brief summary of the picture of change that I have sketched is in order, as is a discussion of its implications for the ethics and ethos of lawyers and for the regulation of both lawyers and judges.
First, some 45 to 50 million cases (holding aside juvenile and traffic proceedings) are filed annually in state courts; in contrast, very few people make their way into federal court. A significant percentage of plaintiffs who do file proceed without lawyers. Many are lawyerless because they cannot afford to pay attorney's fees. 184 Second, the shift away from a court-centric process imposes challenges for claimants and respondents seeking to understand the contours and the methods of newly developed systems. Simply put, finding the ACPR is hard, as is getting data on the processes and results. creating a host of user-friendly materials, such as self-help kiosks, assistance from clerks' offices, and many forms accessible on the web. Parallels cannot be found in the diffuse ADR world. My students and I have poured over a sea of arbitration clauses and governing rules to try to figure out which kinds of rules ("consumer," "commercial," or "wireless") apply to which transactions.
Accessible forms on fee waivers and consumer-friendly guides were difficult to locate.
Third, the new systems being built do not attend to poor people and the need for lawyers. As I have noted when analyzing rules of the AAA, some providers-by choice and as a result of their own views of their own ethics-limit the costs to be imposed on consumers in the arbitrations for which it is the designated provider. 185 In 2013, the AAA instituted a $200 filing fee for consumers and continued applying that fee in its 2014 consumer rule revisions. 186 A few state statutes in turn impose regulations. In 2002, as part of its packet of arbitration regulations, California required fee waivers for "indigent consumers," defined as those with incomes of less than "300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines." California instructed providers to give consumers notice of this option and to create forms for sworn declarations that a particular consumer qualified; providers were not to ask for additional information. 187 The AAA has complied with a form labeled "Waiver of Fees Notice for Use by California Consumers Only," 188 which is available on the web.
Another document is available for the rest of the country, entitled an "Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees." 1 89 That affidavit requires consumers outside of California to make detailed disclosures of assets, income, and liabilities and does not indicate the availability of full waivers. Notably, the AAA reports that it has given waivers when requests are madel 90 but that it does not track the numbers or kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.1 91 Holding California aside, publicly accessible analogues to court-based "in forma pauperis" fee waivers are not available in arbitration. 192 Fourth, the problem of learning about the use of arbitration is mirrored by the problems of learning about the use of ADR in general. To the extent public records exist, individual consumer arbitrations are rare. Most state and federal courts do not require data collection on other forms of ADR used under their aegis. In contrast, as my opening charts reflect, federal and state courts regularly publish data on filed cases.
Fifth, aside from the arbitration mandates, when lawyers can work in courts, many are functioning as parts of aggregated cases of various forms. For example, reliance on MDLs has grown, enabling cost sharing characterized by cross-plaintiff subsidies providing an infusion of resources for individual litigants and their lawyers. Those arrangements result in a host of dispositions, many of which provide comprehensive resolutions. The utilities of doing so are debated, but even with hostility to class actions, market pressures have and will continue to produce lawyers and judges and private dispute resolvers bundling parties and claims. And like ADR and mandated arbitration, much of the decision making goes unseen and relatively unregulated.
As a consequence, the vitality of courts, both state and federal, has been put into question, as has the relevance of constitutional doctrine calling for "open courts" and "rights to remedies." The public is excluded in most pretrial and ADR processes based in courts, has a hard time finding agencybased adjudication, and is generally precluded from attending the arbitrations mandated by federal law. Professionals (be they judges, lawyers, or other dispute resolvers), as well as repeat player litigants, There, the AAA explains that, for its hardship affidavit "additional information. . . may be considered," including "past income, assets . .. and income prospects," and that the decision is discretionary. Id.; see also CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 11 n.51
and accompanying text (reporting that "the consumer can apply for a hardship waiver of otherwise applicable administrative fees," but not citing to the form itself). 191. In its research, the CFPB reported it had identified twenty-two consumer requests for fee waivers, and twenty-three "California" fee waiver requests, in its review of the 1,847 disputes that the AAA administered that the CFPB studied. The CFPB reported that it had not recorded the results of the request, based on the "limited data" CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 77. function with minimal or no oversight from the public, as almost all courtand non-court-based dispute resolution proceedings now occur behind closed doors.
192.
In sum, dispute diffusion is underregulated, with its many facets and few obligations imposed to provide information. Private ordering may well create good outcomes and good process, but the public cannot learn what it does, because we cannot find all the many providers, watch what they do, or know of their decisions. In contrast, courts have to name who their judges are, and these individuals gain their positions through public processes; their caseloads and budgets are open to the public.
State and federal courts, as well as administrative agencies, are centrally important venues, even as they are deeply flawed.1 93 Here, as elsewhere, I need to reiterate that I am not arguing that courts are ideal. More than that, barriers to entry-with lawyers' fees high on the list-pose obstacles to their use. As Gillian Hadfield put it: "The vast majority of ordinary Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolving their claims and the claims made against them."1 94 Further, courts themselves can be exploitative, as Peter Holland recounted in his essay on "junk justice." He examined 4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts; unrepresented debtors regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging about $3,000), and those decisions were made without trials, lawyers, or much judicial oversight.1
95
A recent spate of litigation related to court-user fees and fines for those with limited resources has exposed injuries imposed by courts, producing "endless debt cycles and the imprisonment of some for the failure to pay." 1 96 Now famously, the Department of Justice in 2015 exposed the failures of the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri;1 97 rather than "administering justice or protecting the rights of the accused," the local court's goal was "maximizing revenue" through "constitutionally deficient" procedures that had a racially biased impact. 19 8 But what I have just detailed as courts' failures are also tributes to courts, obliged to function in public and therefore as a resource for being able to uncover how they sometimes fail. State and federal judiciaries are required to maintain records and to permit public observation-opening paths to correct injustices, if popular will to do so exists. 19 9 The structure of courts has the potential to provide egalitarian redistribution of authority and the possibility of public oversight of legal authority. Public access permits windows into knowing whether fair treatment is accorded regardless of status. Public processes enable judges to demonstrate their independence. Oversight permits the policing of judges, tasked with vindicating public rights, to ensure the loyalty to those norms. As I write, we are being given a lesson in the value of independent judges, protected from the wrath of public and private actors and obliged to treat disputants in an equal and dignified manner. These are the hallmarks of legitimate dispute resolution. And through all such public activity, debates can take place about what the legal norms and what the fair procedures to apply should be.
Long ago, Jeremy Bentham railed against "Judge[s] & Co.," by whom he meant lawyers who had through the common law created an opaque and self-serving system that benefited themselves. 20 0 The hope is that the democratic practices of the last two centuries have shifted the utility calculus of judges and lawyers. The richness and depth of the contributions to the colloquium interrogate whether paths to reviving public adjudication can be paved. The question is whether lawyers will be part of a social movement, infusing the alternative regimes that now dominate the landscape of civil litigation with an ethos of public obligation to redress the inequalities in our body politic. 
